Saturday, March 12, 2011
Friday, March 11, 2011
Giant Ant Hill Excavated
This is incredible! I wish it were higher quality but you get the idea.
Thursday, March 10, 2011
Greg's bite: Microsoft pays Nokia $1 billion to use Windows 7? | MacTech
By Greg Mills
Talk about mutual desperation or a marriage from hell. "Bloomberg" reports that Nokia has held out for US$1 billion from Microsoft to use Windows 7. Microsoft head honcho Steve Ballmer seems to think he can buy his way into the smartphone market that Microsoft abdicated over the last few years.
Nokia and Microsoft both have seen Apple eat their market share with the viral iPhone and iOS since it was launched. At one time Microsoft had some traction in the semi-smart phone market with its rather primitive phone software. The market shunned the Microsoft OS as it was light years behind Apple's iOS. Nokia, likewise, had a giant share of the dumb phone market and has seen its share drop dramatically since the iPhone 1 taught the world what a true smartphone could do.
A few weeks back the CEO of Nokia famously pounded his chest with a visceral proclamation of defeat at the hands of Apple and Android. The dumb phone market is doomed to sink, to represent a minor league market as consumers choose smart phones as the difference in price between dumb and smart phones is erased. Why buy a featureless cell phone, when for the same money you can get a full featured smart phone?
Nokia, despite the enormous market share they enjoyed, failed to realize the days of the "just a cell phone" devices was over. Now, too late to the party, their desperation has led them to "jump off a burning oil platform into the sea." The dramatic description likens staying with the status quo and being burned to a crisp by Apple or jumping into unknown waters seeking software solutions from an outside source.
The development of the Apple and Google infrastructures -- which includes both the operating systems and well developed app stores -- is a very hard act to follow. The Nokia software department was hopelessly floundering; management knew it but was unable to fix the problems.
Microsoft has seen a very low level of acceptance for its Windows 7, sort of a smartphone comparison to the awful Windows Vista computer OS that was just about completely shunned by the PC market, for a long list of good reasons. With the revelation that Nokia demanded and got a billion dollars cash from Microsoft for adopting WIndows 7 comes the question, "Did Microsoft also pay other handset makers to launch their Windows 7compatible handsets?" If not, the dismal failure in the market place would have me think the handset makers ought to also demand serious money from Microsoft or quit supporting the failed Windows 7 OS.
Sometimes bigger isn't better, it's just bigger. Grasping at "the wrong straw" may well turn out be the last major gaff that takes Nokia down for the count. A failure for Nokia-branded Windows 7 smart phones will likely bring down both Nokia and Microsoft's "too lame, too late to the party" smartphone OS offering that have to be at least a year off. Apple isn't sleeping at the switch. Already hopelessly behind, another year is an eternity in the fast developing smart phone business of today.
The CEO of Nokia seems to forget that if he likens Apple and Android to the fire on the preverbal oil platform, jumping into the sea is also hazardous as there is a deadly great white shark circling the waters who eats half baked products for lunch. That shark is also Apple. The stock market gets it and has seriously discounted both Nokia and Microsoft, expecting the worst. Bigger isn't better, it's just bigger -- and more spectacular when it fails. Windows 7 as a platform hasn't been well supported by the developer community so far, despite begging, cajoling and outright bribery by Microsoft.
The power of a substantial three-point system is impossible to beat. You need solid hardware, solid software and an app store that can compete with Apple and Android. Windows 7 isn't that substantial, their app store is lame and there isn't a good reason for that to change. Nokia should have gone with Android, but that also has its risks as Apple is suing every handset maker who produces handsets for that platform and patent infringement suits are going to hit the fan this year. Look for the Android platform to get seriously hurt by Apple's legal assault.
The smart money has already laughed off the Nokia/Microsoft collaboration as two has beens, trying to resurrect a dead duck. Nokia stock has taken a 25% hit and there is a strong push within Nokia to push back on the deal with Microsoft, which hasn't been signed yet.
History is full of giant companies that didn't see the direction their market was going and slowly faded to black. As I sometimes muse when I wear my oriental wise man hat, "those who stand too long in the road of progress will be run over." Nokia and Microsoft Windows 7 are very likely road kill under the runaway Apple smart phone and iPad machines. Both Nokia and Microsoft failed to see the future and will pay the price.
That's Greg's Bite for today.
(Greg Mills is currently a graphic and Faux Wall Artist in Kansas City. Formerly a new product R&D man for the paint sundry market, he holds 11 US patents. Greg is an Extra Class Ham Radio Operator, AB6SF, iOS developer and web site designer. He's also working on a solar energy startup using a patent pending process for turning waste dual pane glass window units into thermal solar panels used to heat water see: www.CottageIndustySolar.com Married, with one daughter, Greg writes for intellectual property web sites and on Mac/Tech related issues. See Greg's art web site at http://www.gregmills.info He can be emailed at gregmills@mac.com)
Why Nokia failed: 'Wasted 2,000 man years' on UIs that didn't work • The Register
When Nokia CEO Stephen Elop announced that Nokia was abandoning its development of its own smartphone platforms and APIs, and betting the farm on somebody else's, many people asked why it was necessary.
Nokia had spent 15 years trying to develop and maintain its own software, which it regarded as strategic to maintaining its independence. Elop's decisions have ensured that Nokia didn't just get another option to run alongside its own, but it would abandon these, writing off the investments it had already made. In his opinion, these weren't good enough.
But why? Nokia had (and still has) one proven and successful smartphone platform, and had spent years bringing another one to maturity. It had, belatedly, unified both under one API for developers. Yet Elop judged that neither of these two high-end platforms would ever gain the developer support they would need to stay competitive.
Nokia had been watching the Symbian software as it was created, since the mid-1990s, and licensed the operating system before Symbian was even created. Symbian proved to have many advantages over the recent competition in some important areas. With its mature and well-debugged phone stacks, it is better for phone calls than any other smartphone: it drops fewer calls, the calls sound better, and it uses the antenna better. Symbian's power consumption and performance on comparable hardware are also best of class, despite the baroque middleware added over the years by Nokia. Yet Nokia's phones were considered uncompetitive in the marketplace, because new products from Apple and Android had raised the bar for ease of use, particularly for new data applications, and Nokia's user experience was awful.
The UX matters: it's the first thing potential customers see when a friend passes them their new phone in the pub. A well-designed UX is consistent, forgiving and rewarding; Nokia's user experience was inconsistent, unforgiving and hostile. Nokia's designers honed in with meticulous attention to the wrong detail. Apple's iPhoneOS UI had some unusual features – smooth graphics that played transitions at 60-frames-per-second, thanks to a dedicated graphics chip. Instead of redesigning the entire UX, Nokia acquired expensive professional-grade video cameras to determine the animation speed, and having confirmed that yes, it was 60fps, tried to recreate the transitions.
Touch input was welded onto Nokia's Symbian S60 user interface – which had originally been designed for alphanumeric keypad-based phones back in 2000 – and it was a clumsy fit. Punters expected a "direct manipulation" UI, which this plainly wasn't. Long overdue rationalisations to the confusing S60 menu hierarchy or settings weren't executed, making it very hard to do the simplest things.
Nokia showed a demo in 2007, nine months after the iPhone was announced, but before it had even landed on non-US shores. "We can do this passing fad for touch screens, too," Nokia assured developers.
But it was, at best, a stop-gap. And Nokia was still relying on this ugly mess for its "flagship" two years later. The question as to why Nokia surrendered its independence lies in why it took so long to engineer a competitive UI, and then under new management, decided that it couldn't.
I've called it the "for want of a nail" question: if Nokia had a UI, it would not have had to lose its independence. And as Nokia gave up its independence, Europe lost its last global technology platform. US and Japanese companies now dictate the market.
Dead ends
Now the lid is being lifted on this saga.
A great introduction comes from veteran mobile developer and co-author of a couple of technical Symbian books, Mark Wilcox. Wilcox had worked inside and outside Nokia before joining the Symbian Foundation several months after it launched. I'm surprised his account hasn't got more coverage in blogland since it was published last week. It would be the basis for a good disaster movie for techies – but one where the ending is so depressing nobody would want to watch it.
Through incredible software mismanagement, Nokia simultaneously pursued two dead ends, writes Wilcox, neither of which worked. Nokia management had belatedly realised it needed a better story to tell developers, and in early 2008 acquired Trolltech, which has a very successful and well-regarded C++ framework called Qt. Qt doesn't specify a look and feel, though, but the Trolltech had plenty of experience creating these for potential customers, and saw little point in simply recoding a legacy UI that already looked dated. Having done as they were asked, and made Symbian programmable via Qt, they set about modernising and simplifying UI development.
Next page: Design patterns were 'reverse engineered from code'
Brilliant piece on a tragic failure. I am not sure their move to Microsoft will herald any better news.
India Painting Her Car for the Big Class Race
Wednesday, March 09, 2011
Apple updates software for the Apple TV | MacTech
Apple has updated the software for the US$99, streaming-only Apple TV to version 4.2 It adds support for AirPlay in iOS 4.3, support for Dolby Digital 5.1 surround sound when playing Netflix videos and the ability to access MLB.TV and NBA League Pass Broadband content
There are also new slideshow themes; you can view photos with the new Scrapbook, Photo Mobile, and Holiday Mobile slideshow themes. Apple TV 4.2 also improves the on-screen keyboard, letting you search and enter names and passwords more easily, according to Apple.
You can update the Apple TV software via iTunes.
I am buying
Sunday, March 06, 2011
Saturday, March 05, 2011
India and Amara on Mt Tolmie
Thursday, February 24, 2011
Wednesday, February 23, 2011
Aviary Beat Creator
This is a cool Chrome App that allows you to create beats. Very simple UI that works. Here is a simple little snippet I created in a few minutes......
The REAL Death Of The Music Industry
Updated and correct information on the music industry. This is fascinating stuff if you have any interest in the music industry. Give it a read....
Christchurch earthquake - The Big Picture
The devastation in Christchurch is unbelievable. I was there 20 years ago....the city is remarkably like Victoria. It is almost the exact same population and has a strong British history and feel to the place.
Saturday, February 19, 2011
Steve Jobs Doesn’t Want to Kill Publishers, But Apple’s Subscription Strategy Will
Apple should clearly offer a lower percentage on subscriptions (say 10%). However, as far as offering the users information to publishers (it's opt-in not opt-out) Apple is clearly siding with the consumer on this one.
For Mobile Apps, It’s 1996 All Over Again
It's interesting to note how much faster the app economy is growing then did the web during the same early stage.
Saturday, February 12, 2011
Tuesday, February 08, 2011
Video: Davis 3 Wheeler car (1948) - Boing Boing
Video: Davis 3 Wheeler car (1948)
"This little chariot can really run you around in circles." I'd certainly like a Davis 3-Wheeler. And a 1950s voice like the narrator too. (Thanks, Jeff Cross!)
A brief history of the BlackBerry UI • reghardware
About half the people with a BlackBerry know that if you press space twice you get full-stop space. But only a few of them know that you can use space in email addresses to get full-stops and @ symbols. Tell them and their eyes light up with the thought that their little tool has just become that much more productive.
This is the major problem with a user interface, and in particular mobile phone user interfaces: discovery. On a PC you can "lead" users into shortcuts and how to use things. A mobile UI should be just as obvious.
Ten years ago, Nokia had the reputation for being leader of the pack with user interfaces. There were two reasons for this. One is that they really did have the best UI. The other is that market dominance meant that they were the most familiar. So even complicated, not-so-obvious things such as pressing the “menu*” button to switch off the keyboard lock became natural.
That’s the thing with user interfaces. Once you have become habituated to something it becomes second nature. Why should a square mean “stop” when the road sign is octagonal? It’s all about balance: a balance of features against complexity.
Nokia gained the lead when Christian Lindholm brought psychologists in to understand how people related to phones. Before then the decisions had been made by engineers. One of the many fruits of this was the Nokia 6310, still cited as the best business phone ever. An early Bluetooth device, it really got the balance of ease-of-use against features right. One of the other, spectacular ease-of-use successes was the 3310 and the Navi-key interface.
All about buttons
Ask a product manager what would make their phone simple and they say “dedicated buttons”. Let’s have a button for the camera, one for turning the light on and off, one for GPS, one for Wi-Fi. Soon you have more buttons than a Cadbury’s factory and it’s horrifically complicated. What made Navi-key great was that in addition to the numbers there was up/down, cancel and a single softkey.
You want the fewest buttons for the tasks you want to complete. The problem comes when you add features. There is a balance between the number of buttons and what you want the phone to do. Start adding features to a phone with too few buttons and you’ve no idea what to press to do what.
Where the BlackBerry got it right, from day one, is knowing what it was about: messaging. And particularly email. Indeed, first generation BlackBerries didn’t do voice, and when it was added, it was only with headphone. The BlackBerry has always been about email, a strength it takes from its “focus group of one”: Mike Lazaridis, RIM’s CEO. Instead of asking lots of naive users what they would like the device to do, the BlackBerry was built around Lazaridis’s view of what a device should do.
This single-mindedness has helped keep the focus on mail, but as the number of features has grown the device has had to evolve. What’s not shown, until OS 6.0, is that the foundations for a messaging-led platform make everything else work that bit better.
Next page: The first generation of BlackBerries